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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal Circuit”) delivered only six precedential trademark 
opinions in 2005.1  It also issued six non-precedential trademark 
                                                          
 * Stephen R. Baird is a shareholder of Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., a 
Minneapolis-based general practice law firm.  He is head of Winthrop & Weinstine’s 
Intellectual Property and Trademark and Brand Management Practice Groups.  The 
author would like to thank Samuel Lockner and Kyle Kaiser, Winthrop & Weinstine 
associates, and Brent Lorentz, a Winthrop & Weinstine summer associate, for their 
capable assistance and dedication in preparing this Article.  The author, a 1990-91 
law clerk to The Honorable Wilson Cowen, dedicates this work to distinguished 
inactive Senior Judge Wilson Cowen of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
 1. In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005); SKF USA, Inc. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire 
Fashions, Inc., 424 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. 
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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opinions during the year.2  The Federal Circuit’s dozen trademark 
cases for 2005 came from three different sources:  the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”), the International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”), and two federal district courts.  The 
Federal Circuit appears to have been in a fairly affirming mood of 
both the TTAB and ITC during 2005, siding with the ITC in the one 
case it reviewed,3 siding with the TTAB in six of its nine decisions,4 
affirming in part two TTAB decisions,5 and vacating only one.6  In 
contrast, the Federal Circuit disturbed both of the trademark 
decisions coming from federal district courts in 2005.7  Of the many 
interesting substantive and procedural trademark issues confronted 
by the court during 2005, only one was identified as an issue of first 
impression.8 
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT TRADEMARK CASES 
A. Res Judicata/Issue Preclusion 
In 2005, the Federal Circuit issued only one precedential opinion 
concerning procedural issues in a trademark case.  In Mayer/Berkshire 
Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc.,9 the court reviewed a summary 
judgment decision of the TTAB that dismissed an opposition brought 
by Mayer/Berkshire to prevent registration of the trademark 
BERKSHIRE in International Class 25 for various categories of 
clothing made by Berkshire Fashions.10  Circuit Judge Pauline 
                                                          
 2. Stoller v. N. Telepresence Corp., 152 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Hartco 
Eng’g, Inc. v. Wang’s Int’l, Inc., 142 F. App’x 455 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Stoller v. 
Hyperstealth Biotech. Corp., 131 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Precision Cuts, 
Inc., 131 F. App’x 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Decorations for Generations, Inc. v. Home 
Depot USA, Inc., 128 F. App’x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Innovation Dev. Group, 126 
F. App’x 471 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 3. SKF USA, 423 F.3d at 1318. 
 4. In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d at 1043; N. Telepresence Corp., 152 F. App’x at 
927; In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1214; In re Precision Cuts, Inc., 131 F. App’x at 291; 
Hyperstealth Biotech., 131 F. App’x at 283; In re Innovation Dev. Group, 126 F. App’x at 
474. 
 5. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301; Palm Bay Imps., Inc., 396 F.3d at 
1377. 
 6. Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1234. 
 7. Hartco, 142 F. App’x at 461; Decorations for Generations, Inc., 128 F. App’x at 
139. 
 8. SKF USA, 423 F.3d at 1312. 
 9. 424 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 10. Berkshire Fashions sought to register the trademark BERKSHIRE for the 
following goods in Int’l Class 25:  raincoats, sweaters, pocket squares, scarves, 
mantillas, belts, gloves, hats, earmuffs, slippers, tops, blouses, shirts, pants, vests, and 
uniforms.  Id. at 1230-31.  Mayer/Berkshire claimed use of the BERKSHIRE mark 
since 1906 as a trade name and since 1925 as a trademark for the following goods:  
gloves, lingerie, nightgowns, pajamas, t-shirts, leotards, and down vests.  Id. at 1230.  
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Newman, writing for a unanimous three-member panel of the 
Federal Circuit, held that the Board erred in its application of the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, vacated the TTAB’s 
grant of summary judgment, and remanded the opposition for 
further proceedings.11 
Defendant Berkshire Fashions had obtained summary judgment 
because the Board found that prior federal district court litigation 
between the parties had already decided there was no likelihood of 
confusion12 between the respective BERKSHIRE marks of the 
parties.13  The prior federal district court litigation was brought by 
Mayer/Berkshire, claiming trademark infringement and unfair 
competition by Berkshire Fashions.14  At trial, the jury answered “no” 
to the following question:  “Have defendants infringed plaintiff’s 
trademark, i.e., is there a likelihood of confusion resulting from the 
use by defendants of the trademark and trade name ‘Berkshire’?”15  
Given the jury verdict, the district court entered judgment for the 
defendant.  This judgment also caused the TTAB to dismiss a 
previous opposition filed by Mayer/Berkshire against Berkshire 
Fashions’ application to register BERKSHIRE as a trademark for 
certain goods falling within International Class 18, namely, 
                                                          
Since 1990, Mayer/Berkshire has owned eight registrations for BERKSHIRE in 
connection with different items of apparel and hosiery in Int’l Class 25.  Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. The “likelihood of confusion” analysis is the touchstone judicial standard in 
trademark law and is based on section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) 
(2000).  See, e.g., Edwin S. Clark, Finding Likelihood of Confusion With Actual Confusion:  
A Critical Analysis of the Federal Courts’ Approach, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393, 393 
(1992) (“Likelihood of confusion is the cornerstone of trademark infringement.”); 
H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave?  Cybersquatting Rights and Remedies 
Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301, 313-14 (2005) (“One of the most troublesome 
factors for trademark holders tends to be similarity of the goods and competitive 
proximity.”).  Courts typically consider several factors to determine whether 
competing products reach the “likelihood of confusion” threshold.  See, e.g., Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (analyzing 
(1) strength of the trademark, (2) similarity of the marks, (3) proximity of the 
products and their competitiveness with one another, (4) evidence that the senior 
user may “bridge the gap” by developing a product for sale in the market of the 
alleged infringer’s product, (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion, (6) evidence 
that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith, (7) respective quality of the 
products, and (8) sophistication of consumers in the relevant market); see also AMF 
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing non-exclusive 
factors to consider “in determining whether confusion between related goods is 
likely”).  For a general discussion of the likelihood of confusion analysis in trademark 
law, see Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (2004), and 
Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues:  The Federal Circuit’s Standard of 
Review, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (1991). 
 13. Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1231. 
 14. Id. at 1230. 
 15. Id. at 1231. 
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umbrellas, tote bags, and umbrella and scarf sets.16  The question 
posed to the Federal Circuit was whether Mayer/Berkshire’s attempt 
to prevent Berkshire Fashions from registering BERKSHIRE for 
clothing items falling within International Class 25 was precluded by 
the prior federal district court litigation.17 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reviewing controlling18 
and non-controlling19 precedent concerning the re-litigation 
avoidance doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The court 
recognized that the “likelihood of confusion” issue decided by a 
federal district court as part of a trademark infringement analysis only 
“presents a ‘superficial similarity’”20 and will not always control the 
outcome of a likelihood of confusion determination concerning the 
question of trademark registration before the TTAB.21  According to the 
court, the issue at litigation addressed whether Berkshire Fashions 
displayed the BERKSHIRE mark or the Berkshire Fashions trade 
name on certain products in such a way as to likely cause confusion 
with Mayer/Berkshire’s registered BERKSHIRE trademarks.22  In 
contrast, the court noted that a trademark opposition proceeding 
“requires consideration not only of what the applicant has already 
marketed or has stated the intention to market, but of all the items 
for which registration is sought.”23  Because there was a reasonable 
dispute as to whether Berkshire Fashions’ trademark application 
“embraces a broader statement of goods than those before the 
district court,” summary judgment was inappropriate.24  Indeed, the 
court criticized the Board for loosely referring to “garments” in 
                                                          
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1231-32. 
 18. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) 
(distinguishing the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel); Jet, Inc. v. 
Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining the basis of 
res jucicata, or “claim preclusion”). 
 19. Am. Hygenic Labs., Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 855, 856-57 
(T.T.A.B. 1986) ( 
[I]f res judicata applies at all, it must rest on the principle of claim 
preclusion, that is, that opposer’s claim of priority and likelihood of 
confusion in the opposition is precluded because that claim has been 
determined by virtue of the disposition of the civil action . . . .  We do not 
believe that claim preclusion applies in this case. 
); see also In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Dallas, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1214, 1218 
(T.T.A.B. 2001) (addressing whether an infringement action regarding the call 
letters of two broadcast stations is licensed in a trademark sense, while leaving the 
door open for future FCC discretion if a similar issue arises).   
 20. Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Jet, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1364-65). 
 21. Id. at 1232-33. 
 22. Id. at 1233. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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describing what was at issue in the prior district court judgment and 
the current Berkshire Fashions’ trademark application, holding that 
“[p]recedent and practice require a more detailed analysis.”25  
Because the Board failed to analyze and compare each separate item 
of clothing, the court determined the Board had “not establish[ed] 
preclusion as to the specific items for which registration is sought and 
opposed.”26 
In vacating and remanding the Board’s decision to grant summary 
judgment, the Federal Circuit was also persuaded that 
Mayer/Berkshire had presented sufficient evidence of actual 
confusion resulting from allegedly changed marketing practices of 
Berkshire Fashions following the favorable district court judgment.27  
Mayer/Berkshire sought to show that Berkshire Fashions went from 
“inconspicuous marking of some goods with labels bearing only the 
trade name” to “major marketing activity promoting the trademark 
BERKSHIRE in a manner” that has caused “significant actual 
confusion.”28  In conclusion, the court cited authority for the 
proposition that preclusion is a “drastic remedy,” warning that 
“[c]aution is warranted in the application of preclusion by the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), for the purposes of administrative 
trademark procedures include protecting both the consuming public 
and the purveyors.”29  Because the court was not satisfied that the 
Board had found preclusion “certain to every intent” and because 
“[t]he question of the likelihood of confusion presented sufficiently 
different issues and transactional facts to bar the application of 
preclusion,” summary judgment was inappropriate.30 
B. Rules Concerning Extension of Time to Oppose 
In 2005, the Federal Circuit also had occasion to hear two TTAB 
appeals involving trademark procedural issues, filed by the infamous 
Leo Stoller, who has been identified by some commentators as a 
“trademark troll.”31  Mr. Stoller lost both appeals in non-precedential 
opinions. 
                                                          
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1234. 
 27. Id. at 1233. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1234. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See The Troll Who Stole Super Sunday, Post of Marty Schwimmer to The 
Trademark Blog (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.schwimmerlegal.com/archives/2006/02 
/the_troll_who_s.html.  John L. Welch, author of the award-winning TTABlog:  
Keeping Tabs on the TTAB posted an article on January 26, 2006, entitled It’s Time to 
Tackle the ‘Trademark Trolls’.  Welch’s TTABlog closely follows the actions of Mr. Leo 
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In Stoller v. Hyperstealth Biotechnology Corp.,32 Circuit Judge Pauline 
Newman, writing for a three-member panel of the Federal Circuit, 
affirmed the TTAB’s decision refusing to remand a multi-class 
trademark registration application that Mr. Stoller apparently wanted 
to oppose.33  Hyperstealth had filed an application to register the 
mark HYPERSTEALTH with respect to two different classes of goods, 
International Class 5 (covering, inter alia, pharmaceuticals) and 
International Class 10 (covering, inter alia, medical devices).34  
Following Hyperstealth’s publication in the Official Gazette,35 Mr. 
Stoller filed an opposition as to the Class 5 goods based on exclusive 
rights he claims in his alleged trademark STEALTH.36  Upon learning 
of the opposition, and undoubtedly looking to avoid a dispute with 
Mr. Stoller, Hyperstealth abandoned the registration application with 
respect to Class 5 goods, and the application was then approved with 
respect to the Class 10 goods.37 
Apparently wanting to oppose the HYPERSTEALTH mark with 
respect to the Class 10 goods as well, but having failed to do so with 
his original opposition, Mr. Stoller attempted to create new law in his 
arguments for reconsideration.38  First, he claimed that res judicata 
made his successful opposition for the Class 5 goods applicable to the 
Class 10 goods as well.39  The court easily disposed of this argument by 
noting that the likelihood of confusion analysis would be completely 
different with respect to different classes of goods.40  Second, Mr. 
Stoller argued that collateral estoppel should apply.41  The court 
easily disposed of this argument as well.  Because the filing of an 
opposition followed by the voluntary abandonment of an application 
did not constitute actual litigation before the TTAB, collateral 
estoppel could not apply.42  In addition to the well-established legal 
precedent opposing Mr. Stoller’s arguments, practical realities 
further necessitated the TTAB’s decision because, had Mr. Stoller’s 
                                                          
Stoller and his related companies.  Apparently Mr. Stoller and his various entities 
have filed several hundred requests for extension of time to oppose registration of a 
wide variety of marks during the last couple of months in 2005 and in January 2006.  
Posting of John L. Welch to the TTABlog, http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2006/01 
/ttablog-update-on-leo-stoller-and.html (Jan. 26, 2006). 
 32. 131 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-precedential). 
 33. Id. at 281. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 281-82. 
 38. Id. at 282. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 282-83. 
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arguments succeeded, it would have permitted an opposer to 
disregard the clear rules requiring the payment of a separate filing 
fee for each class of goods or services being opposed.43 
In Stoller v. Northern Telepresence Corp.,44 the Federal Circuit, in a per 
curiam opinion, affirmed the TTAB’s decision denying as untimely 
Mr. Stoller’s request for extension of time to oppose registration of 
the trademark DARKSTAR filed by Northern Telepresence.45  Mr. 
Stoller made three separate attempts to extend the time to oppose 
registration of the DARKSTAR mark, and each failed.  In his first 
attempt, the unsigned request for extension of time46 to oppose 
arrived at the PTO several days after expiration of the thirty-day 
opposition period.47  In addition, the certificate of mailing 
accompanying the request, dated prior to the expiration of the 
opposition period, also was not signed48 by Mr. Stoller.49  Had both 
the request and the certificate been signed, the court presumed the 
filing would have been considered timely, since they were dated prior 
to expiration of the opposition period.50  Since the facts showed that 
both were unsigned, the court agreed with the TTAB that this first 
extension attempt was defective.51 
Mr. Stoller’s second extension attempt responded to the TTAB’s 
invitation to cure the defect in the first request pursuant to a rule of 
practice in trademark cases that, in the court’s words, prohibits the 
Board from refusing to consider “an unsigned paper . . . if a signed 
copy is submitted to the Board within the time limit set forth in the 
Board’s notification of the signature defect.”52  This second attempt 
contained a copy of Mr. Stoller’s first extension request, and while he 
did sign the second request, he did not date it, and while he signed 
                                                          
 43. See Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, Filing an Opposition, 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.101(d)(1) (2005) (“The opposition must be accompanied by the required fee for 
each party joined as opposer for each class in the application for which registration is 
opposed . . . .”). 
 44. 152 F.App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-precedential). 
 45. Id. at 924. 
 46. 37 C.F.R. § 2.102(a) requires that extensions of time to oppose must be 
signed.  Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, Extension of Time for Filing an 
Opposition, 37 C.F.R. § 2.102(a) (2005). 
 47. N. Telepresence, 152 F. App’x at 925. 
 48. 37 C.F.R. § 2.197 requires that certificates of mailing be signed.  Rules of 
Practice in Trademark Cases, Certificate of Mailing or Transmission, 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.197 (2005). 
 49. N. Telepresence, 152 F. App’x at 925. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (citing Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, Service and Signing of 
Papers, 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(e) (2005)). 
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the certificate of mailing, it was dated well outside the thirty-day limit, 
rendering the second request defective as well.53 
The Federal Circuit described Mr. Stoller’s third request as a 
“copy” of the original first request, but unlike the first request, he 
both signed and dated this third request within the original thirty-day 
statutory period.54  The TTAB held that the record contained no 
evidence that this fully signed and timely dated extension request had 
been received by the Board or timely mailed to the Board.55  
Alternatively, the Board held that Mr. Stoller failed to prove that he 
had actually signed the first request within the original thirty-day 
statutory period, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(e).56  After 
reviewing the Board’s full record, the court concluded that the third 
request was not faxed to the Board by Mr. Stoller until almost one 
year after the original unsigned request was filed.57  Because the court 
agreed that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s 
finding that Mr. Stoller failed to make a timely request for extension 
of time to oppose registration of the DARKSTAR mark, it affirmed 
the Board’s decision.58  In doing so, however, the Federal Circuit 
explicitly left open the question whether the Board had correctly 
interpreted 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(e) as requiring that the “signed copy” 
be signed within the original thirty-day statutory period.59 
II. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Likelihood of Confusion 
In 2005, the Federal Circuit issued only one precedential opinion 
interpreting the “likelihood of confusion” standard set forth in 
section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.60  In Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve 
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,61 Palm Bay appealed a 
decision of the TTAB refusing registration of the mark VEUVE 
ROYALE for sparkling wine.62  The refusal was based on likely 
confusion with the marks VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN, VEUVE 
                                                          
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 926. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 927. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text 
(discussing the likelihood of confusion standard). 
 61. 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 62. Id. at 1370. 
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CLICQUOT, and THE WIDOW.63  Specifically, Palm Bay asserted that 
the Board had made erroneous findings with respect to four of the 
factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.:64  (1) the 
similarity of the marks, (2) third-party use of the term VEUVE, 
(3) the fame of appellee Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee 
En 1772 (“VCP”)’s marks, and (4) purchaser sophistication.65  First, 
Palm Bay took issue with the Board’s finding that the marks were 
similar, arguing that the Board had improperly stated and applied 
the similarity test.66  The test for similarity or dissimilarity requires an 
examination of the appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial 
impression of the marks; however, the Board had carelessly treated 
“commercial impression” as the ultimate conclusion to be reached.67  
Noting that “commercial impression” had occasionally been used as a 
proxy for the ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of 
marks, the court decided that such a minor misstatement of the test 
in an otherwise proper analysis would not create reversible error.68 
Also, Palm Bay unsuccessfully argued that the Board did not give 
sufficient weight to the dominance of CLICQUOT in VCP’s marks.69  
The court found that VEUVE was clearly a distinctive term as applied 
to wines, and thus was conceptually strong as a trademark; the 
accompanying use of CLICQUOT did not diminish that fact.70  
Furthermore, since VEUVE was the dominant feature of Palm Bay’s 
mark (as opposed to the laudatory ROYALE), it was proper to 
conclude that the use of the same distinctive term at the beginning of 
the marks rendered them similar.71  Thus, the Court affirmed the 
Board’s finding that the marks were more similar than dissimilar.72 
Second, Palm Bay claimed that the Board erred when it rejected 
evidence of third-party usage of VEUVE on other alcoholic 
beverages.73  Again, the court affirmed the Board’s decision.  
Although such evidence could sometimes be used to show that a 
similar mark was relatively weak and entitled to narrow protection, 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 1371. 
 64. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In In re DuPont, the U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals ruled that an inquiry into the likelihood of consumer 
confusion was a question of fact and articulated thirteen factors that should be 
weighed when evaluating the likelihood of confusion. 
 65. Palm Bay Imps., Inc., 396 F.3d at 1371. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1371-72. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1372. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1372-73. 
 72. Id. at 1373. 
 73. Id. 
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such evidence was only relevant if the consuming public was exposed 
to the mark.74  Here, the only evidence offered was a Beverage Media 
Guide circulated to distributors and the testimony of a private 
investigator who found Veuve de Varnay for sale in six New York 
stores and on Internet Web sites and restaurant lists.75  The court 
found that the Media Guide was irrelevant because it provided no 
indication that the consuming public was aware of the third party-
usage.76  Also, the court concluded that the remaining evidence could 
not possibly demonstrate that third-party usage was sufficiently 
widespread to “condition” the consuming public to associate VEUVE 
with alcoholic beverages in general.77  Thus, the evidence of third-
party usage was not significant enough to undermine the strength of 
VCP’s mark and the Board’s rejection of the evidence was deemed 
proper.78 
Third, the court addressed the issue of fame and explicitly stated 
that fame for likelihood of confusion purposes differs from fame for 
dilution purposes.79  Under a dilution analysis, fame is an either-or 
proposition; however, under a likelihood of confusion analysis, fame 
exists along a spectrum entitling parties to corresponding degrees of 
protection.80  The court then determined that fame for the likelihood 
of confusion analysis should be based upon the specific product 
market.81  Thus, in order for a mark to be famous such that it is 
entitled to greater protection, it need only be known within the 
segment of the population likely to use the product.82  Specifically, 
the court stated that “fame of a mark under the fifth DuPont factor is 
the class of customers and potential customers of a product or 
service, and not the general public.”83  The court then found that 
substantial sales volume and advertising expenditures were adequate 
to support the finding regarding the fame of the mark.84 
Finally, the court addressed the purchaser sophistication.  The 
relevant inquiry under this factor was “the conditions under which, 
and to whom, sales are made.”85  If the consumers are sophisticated 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1374. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1375. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1375-76. 
 85. Id. at 1376. 
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and the item is not subject to impulse purchases, more similarity 
between the marks can be tolerated.86  In this case, the Board found 
that champagne and sparkling wines were not necessarily expensive 
goods that were always purchased by sophisticated individuals.87  
Many brands of champagne and sparkling wine sell for less than ten 
dollars per bottle and general consumers, not just connoisseurs, 
constitute the purchasing public.88  Thus, the Board had properly 
applied the “purchaser sophistication” factor.89 
Ancillary to the preceding analysis, the court discussed the doctrine 
of foreign equivalents90 because the Board had found Palm Bay’s 
mark to be similar to THE WIDOW.  (VEUVE ROYALE translates 
from French to English as “Royal Widow”).  The court noted that the 
doctrine of foreign equivalents should be applied only when the 
average American purchaser would “stop and translate the word into 
its English equivalent.”91  Since the court was unconvinced that the 
average American purchaser would translate “VEUVE” to “widow,” 
substantial evidence did not support the Board’s finding on 
likelihood of confusion for THE WIDOW. 
B. Disclaimers 
In In re Stereotaxis, Inc.,92 the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s 
finding of mere descriptiveness and affirmed the TTAB’s decision to 
condition registration of the trademark STEREOTAXIS and Design 
for medical goods and services on the applicant disclaiming the word 
STEREOTAXIS.93  The applicant sought to register the mark shown 
below in connection with twelve goods and services, including 
“Magnetic Navigation Systems for Medical Applications,” “Magnetic 
Medical Devices,” “Magnets and Electromagnets for Medical 
Applications,” and “Medical Imaging Apparatus.”94 
 
 
 
                                                          
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1377 (explaining that the doctrine of foreign equivalents refers to the 
practice of translating foreign words from common languages “into English to 
determine genericness, descriptiveness, as well as similarity of connotation in order 
to ascertain confusing similarity to English word marks”). 
 91. Id. (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. 109 (T.T.A.B. 1976)). 
 92. 429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 93. Id. at 1040. 
 94. Id. 
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The Examining Attorney of the PTO concluded that the term 
STEREOTAXIS was merely descriptive and had to be disclaimed 
before applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design mark could be 
registered.95  The applicant appealed the disclaimer requirement to 
the TTAB, and the TTAB affirmed.96  Specifically, the TTAB ruled 
that “the term stereotaxis immediately describes . . . significant 
information concerning the nature, purpose or function of at least 
some, if not most, of the applicant’s goods, and therefore must be 
disclaimed.”97  The applicant sought reversal of the TTAB’s decision 
on two grounds:  (1) the TTAB failed to identify the products and 
services offered under applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design mark 
that STEREOTAXIS merely described, and (2) there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that STEREOTAXIS is descriptive of any of the 
products and services bearing applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design 
mark.98 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the applicant’s first ground for 
appeal, namely, that the TTAB was required to identify the particular 
products and services that STEREOTAXIS merely described.99  The 
court stated: 
[T]he Trademark Office may require a disclaimer as a condition of 
registration if the mark is merely descriptive for at least one of the 
products or services involved.  We know of no requirement in the 
trademark statute or elsewhere that the Board must make the 
additional analysis the [a]pplicant seeks in order to determine that 
a proposed mark is merely descriptive as applied to the 
[a]pplicant’s products and services.100 
The court further disagreed with the applicant’s argument that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the TTAB’s finding that 
STEREOTAXIS was merely descriptive of the goods and services 
bearing applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design mark.101  The court 
stressed that the TTAB’s determination of mere descriptiveness is a 
factual finding that will be upheld unless unsupported by substantial 
evidence.102  Here, the evidence relied on by the TTAB consisted of 
dictionary definitions103 and press releases.104 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1040-41. 
 97. Id. at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1041-42. 
 103. The court noted that the TTAB found support from the ENCARTA WORLD 
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The applicant argued that the TTAB should have limited its 
definition of STEREOTAXIS to “products and services that utilize an 
external reference frame, a computer and a scanning device, which 
the [a]pplicant’s products do not use.”105  The applicant further 
contended that other definitions exist “that are more reflective of the 
purchasing public’s understanding of the term.”106  The Federal 
Circuit disagreed and determined that substantial evidence 
supported the TTAB’s finding.107  The court stated that the applicant 
did not “show that an external reference frame, a computer and a 
scanning device are essential elements, rather than simply a common 
methodology, of stereotaxis.”108  The court further stated that in order 
for the applicant to succeed on its argument, it would have to “show 
that its proposed definition would be understood by the relevant 
public—here the medical profession—to be the only meaning of the 
term.”109  The court concluded that because the applicant failed to 
establish the foregoing “the fact that the [a]pplicant’s products may 
use magnets and magnetic imagery rather than an external frame of 
reference and computer generated imagery is not enough to invalidate 
the finding that the [a]pplicant’s proposed use of the term 
‘stereotaxis’ is merely descriptive of its products and services.”110 
This case stands for three propositions:  (1) neither an examining 
attorney nor the TTAB is required to specify which good or service a 
proposed mark merely describes, but rather it is sufficient to find that 
the proposed mark is merely descriptive of one of the products or 
services; (2) the fact that evidence exists to support a different 
classification of a mark is insufficient, but instead an applicant must 
                                                          
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1753 (1st ed. 1999) which defines “stereotaxis” as a “‘technique 
in brain surgery:  neurological surgery involving the insertion of delicate instruments 
that are guided to a specific area by the use of three-dimensional scanning 
techniques.’”  The court further referenced MedTerms.com, an online medical 
dictionary that defines “stereotaxis” as the “‘use of a computer and scanning devices 
to create three-dimensional pictures.’”  In re Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d at 1042 (citing 
MEDTERMS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, http://www.medterms.com (last visited Mar. 12, 
2006)). 
 104. The TTAB found further support from a press release by Advent 
International which the court determined adequately demonstrated the public’s 
perception of the applicant’s products and services.  In re Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d at 
1042. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107. The court further stated that the issue before it was not whether evidence 
existed to support a finding that the proposed mark could be classified differently, 
but rather whether substantial evidence supported the TTAB’s decision.  Id. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 
(C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
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demonstrate that the TTAB’s decision is unsupported by substantial 
evidence; and (3) a good or service can vary from the definition(s) 
relied upon by the TTAB for the finding that a proposed mark is 
merely descriptive provided the relevant public does not believe the 
precise definition is the only meaning of the term. 
C. Genericness, Mere Descriptiveness, and Secondary Meaning 
In 2005, the Federal Circuit issued one precedential opinion and 
two nonprecedential opinions concerning trademark genericness.  In 
In re STEELBUILDING.COM,111 the TTAB affirmed the PTO’s refusal 
to register the claimed mark STEELBUILDING.COM.112  The Board’s 
affirmance was based on an alternative determination that the mark 
was either generic or merely descriptive.113  The Federal Circuit 
vacated the finding of genericness, but affirmed the refusal on the 
grounds of mere descriptiveness and lack of secondary meaning.114 
The court articulated the two-part genericness inquiry as first 
determining the genus of goods or services and then  determining 
whether the term sought to be registered was understood by the 
relevant public to refer primarily to such genus of goods or services.115  
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by attacking the genus used in 
the Board’s decision.116 
The court’s starting point for its attack was the subtle, yet critical 
difference between how the applicant described the goods and 
services bearing its mark and how the Board described the applicant’s 
goods and services.117  Specifically, the applicant described its goods 
and services as “computerized on-line retail services in the field of 
pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing systems,”118 while the 
Board described applicant’s goods and services as being “the sale of 
pre-engineered steel buildings on the Internet.”119 
While the two descriptions seem similar in meaning, the 
description used by the Board failed to account for the fact that 
STEELBUILDING.COM provided more than sales.120  Specifically, the 
applicant’s Website provided highly interactive options that allowed 
the customer to create unique designs and then obtain pricing 
                                                          
 111. 415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 112. Id. at 1296. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1296-97. 
 116. Id. at 1298. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1296. 
 119. Id. at 1297-98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1298. 
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information for the designs.121  Therefore, the Website was much 
more than a mere shopping guide.122  The Board’s misunderstanding 
of the proper genus would have been an adequate ground for the 
Federal Circuit to vacate the Board’s genericness decision.123 
Finally, the court addressed the significance of attaching .COM to a 
mark, finding that it was no different than attaching a word such as 
“company” or “incorporated.”124  Following precedent, the court 
rejected the Board’s position that the addition of a top-level domain 
indicator could never render a term sufficiently distinctive for 
registration.125  In In re STEELBUILDING.COM, the court determined 
that the addition of .COM expanded the meaning of the mark to 
include Internet services that enabled individual design of steel 
structures.126 
Notwithstanding the court’s determination that 
STEELBUILDING.COM was not generic, the court nonetheless 
upheld the TTAB decision on the grounds that the mark was 
descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning.127  For 
descriptiveness purposes, STEELBUILDING would convey the same 
impression as “steel buildings;” and since the addition of .COM only 
implied that the services would be associated with online commerce, 
it did not alter the descriptive character of the mark.128 
In the secondary meaning analysis, the court dismissed a large 
portion of the evidence provided by the applicant.129  The court 
dismissed evidence of Internet advertising because the applicant did 
not spend enough money.130  The court dismissed evidence relating 
to an Internet poll because it lacked sufficient reliability.131  The court 
also reviewed additional, unspecified evidence presented to the 
Board, but determined that “none of that evidence established the 
proposed mark’s distinctiveness.”132 
In partial dissent, Circuit Judge Richard Linn disagreed with the 
treatment of the evidence of secondary meaning provided by the 
applicant.133  Specifically, he felt that distinctiveness “attributable to 
                                                          
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1300. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1301 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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domain name recognition” should not have been discounted because 
“domain name recognition is a form of source identification . . . .”134  
He considered it legal error to discount distinctiveness evidence on 
the simple basis that the mark was also a domain name.135 
Additionally, Judge Linn disagreed with the discounting of 
applicant’s Internet advertising evidence, particularly when the case 
relied on for dismissing the evidence was a 1994 case decided before 
Internet advertising became a viable strategy.136  The applicant’s sales 
had risen from $500,000 to $4,500,000 in seven months.137  Thus, even 
though the actual money spent on advertising may have been modest, 
the effect may have been powerful enough to create secondary 
meaning.138 
Months prior to the Federal Circuit’s precedential decision in In re 
STEELBUILDING.COM, the court issued a nonprecedential opinion 
affirming the TTAB’s decision sustaining the Examining Attorney’s 
refusal to register as merely descriptive the claimed mark TICK TAPE 
for a “hand tool for removing insects attached to human or animal 
hosts.”139  In In re Innovation Development Group, Inc., the Examining 
Attorney requested a copy of the applicant’s published patent and 
used the language describing the device against the applicant and in 
support of the mere descriptiveness finding.140 
In support of its position that TICK TAPE was suggestive and not 
descriptive, the applicant argued that the Board failed to identify any 
components of its tool that could be described as “tape,” nor could it, 
because tape is flexible and its tool is rigid.141  The applicant also 
argued that not all adhesive products are considered “tape,” and 
there are many different types of tape, including magnetic tape, so 
using the term “tape” does not necessarily mean the product has 
adhesive qualities.142  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded.  It 
agreed with the Solicitor that “substantial evidence supports the 
Board’s findings that TICK TAPE is merely descriptive.”143  In 
particular, the court noted the Board’s finding that the term “tape” 
                                                          
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1302. 
 136. Id. at 1303. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. In re Innovation Dev. Group, Inc., 126 F. App’x 471 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 140. The patent described the device as having “a foam backing with an adhesive 
surface” that “will adhere to the body of the tick while the device is pulled away from 
the skin, resulting in the removal of the tick.”  Id. at 472 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 
6,718,686 B2 (filed Feb. 13, 2002)). 
 141. Id. at 472-73. 
 142. Id. at 473. 
 143. Id. 
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has a broad definition that includes “adhesive tape,” and relying on 
the description set forth in the applicant’s published patent, the 
court concluded that the applicant’s product “falls squarely within 
the definition of ‘tick tape,’” such that the claimed “mark TICK TAPE 
would immediately indicate that one component of [the] hand 
tool . . . is particularly useful for removing ticks,” rendering the 
designation merely descriptive.144 
In In re Precision Cuts, Inc.,145 the applicant attempted to register a 
stylized version of the mark PRECISION CUTS for hair cut services.146  
The trademark examiner determined, and the Board affirmed, that 
the mark was generic and thus required a disclaimer of the words in 
the mark.147  On appeal, the court evaluated whether the Board’s 
decision was supported by substantial evidence.148  The evidence at 
issue in the case was the submission by the examiner of sixty 
examples of “precision cut” returned by a NEXIS search.149 
The genericness inquiry requires a two-part analysis.150  First, the 
genus of goods or services must be identified.151  Second, it must be 
shown that the relevant public primarily associates the contested 
mark with the genus of services for which it is to be used.152  In this 
case, the genus was uncontested—it was “haircut services.”153  Thus, 
the ultimate question was whether there was substantial evidence to 
show that the public primarily associated “precision cuts” with haircut 
services.154 
The court held that the NEXIS results constituted sufficient 
evidence, stating that “[a] reasonable person’s credulity would be 
satiated by the hundreds of NEXIS search returns that the examiner, 
and the Board, relied upon to establish a prima facie case that the 
terms are generic.”155  Additionally, the court noted that the PTO was 
not required to administer consumer surveys to discharge its burden 
under a genericness finding.156 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 473-74. 
 145. 131 F. App’x 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 146. Id. at 289. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 290. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 290-91. 
 156. Id. at 291. 
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D. Surname Refusals and The Paris Convention 
The Federal Circuit also had occasion to address a surname refusal 
while revisiting the subject of the Paris Convention157 and its 
application to section 44 of the Lanham Act.158  In In re Rath,159 the 
applicant appealed from a TTAB decision refusing registration of the 
trademarks RATH and DR. RATH on the principal register.160  The 
TTAB refused registration on the ground that the marks were 
ineligible under section 2(e) of the Lanham Act161 because they were 
considered primarily the surname of the applicant.162  Dr. Rath 
advanced the argument that he was entitled to registration on the 
grounds that he possessed a registration of the marks in his country 
of origin.163 
Citing the Paris Convention, he argued that the surname rule was 
at odds with the rights accorded to those holding foreign 
registrations.164  Specifically, he argued that he should not be denied 
registration unless his marks fell within one of the three enumerated 
exceptions provided in Article 6 quinquies of the Paris Convention.165  
Because Article 6 quinquies did not explicitly except the registration 
of surnames, he argued that his registration should be allowed.166 
In affirming the TTAB, the court first held that the Convention was 
not a self-executing treaty; therefore, it was only binding to the extent 
that it had been implemented by Congress.167  Because Congress 
adopted language providing for the registration for foreign marks “if 
eligible,” the court determined that foreign marks must satisfy the 
substantive section 2 requirements of the Lanham Act, including the 
surname rule.168  The court found that the language of section 44(e) 
of the Lanham Act clearly indicated that “if eligible” referred to the 
requirements for registration on the principal register, rather than 
                                                          
 157. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000) (governing international conventions and the 
registration of foreign marks in the United States). 
 159. 402 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 160. Id. at 1208. 
 161. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000) (prohibiting the registration of a mark which is 
“primarily merely a surname”). 
 162. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1208. 
 163. See id. (basing this claim on German trademarks for “nutritional 
supplements, books, grains, and educational services”). 
 164. See id. at 1209 (conceding “that the marks are primarily, merely surnames”). 
 165. Id. (citing Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra, 
note 157). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1209-10. 
 168. Id. at 1211. 
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the eligibility requirements of the Convention.169  Thus, while 
registration may have been required on the supplemental register, 
the court held that no statute or treaty required that the registration 
be on the principal register.170 
The court also revisited the holding of In re Establissements Darty et 
Fils.171  In that case, a foreign registrant attempted to register a mark 
in reliance on section 44(d) of the Lanham Act.172  The court found 
that section 44(d) merely affected domestic priority and prior use 
rules and excused certain foreign applicants from demonstrating use 
in commerce to secure registration under the statute.173  Section 
44(d) did nothing to eliminate the substantive requirements for 
registration on the principal register, i.e., the applicant was still 
required to prove secondary meaning to make an otherwise 
descriptive mark eligible for registration.174  Here, while section 44(e) 
affected the prior use rules, it did nothing to alter the substantive 
bars to registration.175 
In a concurring opinion, Judge William Bryson would have upheld 
the decision on the narrower grounds that surnames were “merely 
descriptive” marks and thus fell within the Convention exceptions as 
marks “devoid of distinctive character.”176  However, citing various 
pieces of legislative history, he believed it was unlikely that the phrase 
“if eligible” referred to the section 2 requirements of the Lanham 
Act.177 
The majority undertook this opportunity to elaborate on the 
interplay between the Paris Convention and the Lanham Act, 
concluding that the Lanham Act did not require contemporaneous 
interpretation of the Convention.178  Meanwhile, the concurring 
opinion argued that the Convention necessarily must be interpreted 
for foreign registrations because the Lanham Act intended to 
“‘provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions 
                                                          
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1211-12. 
 171. 759 F.2d 15 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 172. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1212.  Section 44(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1126(d) (2000), governs applications by individuals who have previously filed an 
application for registration of the mark in certain foreign countries to register marks 
in the United States. 
 173. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1213. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1214. 
 176. Id. at 1220–21 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1213-14 (majority opinion). 
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respecting trademarks . . . entered into between the United States 
and foreign nations.’”179 
E. Gray Market Goods 
In SKF USA, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,180 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision that section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930181 was not violated by four companies’ importation of “gray 
market”182 ball bearings originally manufactured by SKF but not 
authorized for sale in the United States.183  There were no physical 
differences between SKF’s ball bearings authorized for American sale 
and the foreign products; rather, the nature and extent of post-sale 
technical and engineering services differed.184  A customer who 
purchased ball bearings from an “authorized” source would receive, 
for example, access to experienced engineers for on-site consultation 
or access via a “hotline.”185 
The importation of gray market goods violates the Lanham Act if 
the gray market goods are “materially different” from the authorized 
goods.186  In this case, the Federal Circuit addressed an issue of first 
impression187—whether the distinction between domestic goods and 
gray market goods must be physically manifested in the product or 
packaging in order to be “materially different” and thus infringing.188  
The court affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding for the 
first time that “material differences need not be physical in order to 
establish trademark infringement in gray market cases.”189  In 
support, the Federal Circuit “[made] explicit what may only have 
been implicit” in its holding in Gamut v. International Trading 
Commission.190  It noted that the Gamut court developed a “material 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 1216 (Bryson, J., concurring) (quoting Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2000)). 
 180. 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 181. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).  The section makes unlawful, among other things, 
“[t]he importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within 
the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles 
that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under the 
Trademark Act of 1946.”  Id. § 1337(a)(1)(C). 
 182. “Gray market” goods, sometimes called “gray goods,” are goods “‘legally 
acquired abroad[, but] imported [into the United States] without the consent of 
the . . . trademark holder.’”  SKF USA Inc., 423 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Gamut Trading 
Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 200 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 183. Id. at 1309, 1318. 
 184. Id. at 1309. 
 185. Id. at 1309-10. 
 186. Id. at 1313 (citing Gamut, 200 F.3d at 779). 
 187. Id. at 1312. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1314. 
 190. Id. at 1313.  The court in Gamut announced a test under which a company 
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differences” test, not a “physical differences” test for determining 
whether gray goods infringed.191  Thus, the plain language of the test 
demonstrated that a finding of infringement was not limited merely 
to physical differences.  Second, the Gamut court had relied upon 
cases that held nonphysical material differences to be sufficient to 
avoid trademark infringement.192  Finally, the court noted that a 
manufacturer’s goodwill might be invested in nonphysical traits, and 
consumers may consider those traits to be a material difference, the 
lack of which may be confusing.193 
After determining that nonphysical differences may be “material” 
and subject a gray market importer to trademark infringement 
liability, the court next discussed whether the four gray market 
distributors infringed upon SKF’s marks in this case.194  The 
Commission found that there was no infringement because SKF did 
not provide the post-sale technical and engineering support to “all or 
substantially all” of its customers.195 
SKF argued that, to prove infringement, it should only have to 
show that a sufficient number of its goods are materially different 
from the gray goods, and that certain amounts of a trademark 
owner’s nonconforming goods may be ignored if they are of de 
minimis amounts.196  The Federal Circuit disagreed.  Relying on the 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & 
Gem Trading USA, Co.,197 the Federal Circuit held that 
If less than all or substantially all of a trademark owner’s products 
possess the material difference, then the trademark owner has 
placed into the stream of commerce a substantial quantity of goods 
                                                          
may be liable for trademark infringement for importing gray goods when “there are 
differences between the foreign and domestic product and [those] differences are 
material.”  200 F.3d at 779.  The Gamut court set a low threshold for materiality, 
“requiring no more than showing that consumers would be likely to consider the 
differences between the foreign and domestic products to be significant when 
purchasing the product, for such differences would suffice to erode the goodwill of 
the domestic source.”  Id.  For a more complete analysis of the Gamut holding, see 
Stephen R. Baird, Review of the 1999 Trademark Decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1374-76 (2000). 
 191. SKF USA Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 192. See id. at 1314 (stating that “the appropriate test should not be strictly limited 
to physical differences”).  The SKF USA court quoted the Gamut court for the 
proposition that “[d]ifferences in labeling and other written materials have been 
deemed material.”  Id. (quoting Gamut, 200 F.3d at 781). 
 193. Id. at 1314. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1315. 
 196. Id. at 1311, 1316. 
 197. 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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that are or may be the same or similar to those of the importer, 
and then there is no material difference.198 
If the trademark owner sells a substantial amount of 
nonconforming goods, the court reasoned, consumers would not be 
confused by the gray goods.199  Allowing a trademark owner to recover 
“when less than ‘substantially all’ of its goods bear the material 
difference from the gray goods thus would allow the owner itself to 
contribute to the confusion by consumers that it accuses gray market 
importers of creating.”200 The court discounted SKF’s argument that 
the sale of one nonconforming product may defeat an infringement 
claim, emphasizing that “the ‘all or substantially all’ benchmark 
recognizes something less than 100% compliance will suffice . . . .”201 
Finally, the court held that SKF could not meet the standard that 
all or substantially all of its sales were conforming.202  The court noted 
that “it was undisputed that 87.4 percent of [its] sales to authorized 
distributors were supported by the ‘full panoply’ of post-sale technical 
and engineering services.”203  SKF’s sales through another business 
unit, Chicago Rawhide, provided the services only on a discretionary 
basis based on the size of the customer and the customer’s history, 
and thus there was no guarantee that the customer would consistently 
receive the post-sale services.204  Consequently, the court refused to 
count sales through the Chicago Rawhide division as conforming.205  
The court noted that SKF’s sales through “alternate channels of 
distribution,” including sales to gray market distributors, surplus 
distributors, and others further undercuts its claim that substantially 
all of its goods sold were conforming.206  The court rejected SKF’s 
claim that the goods distributed in the “alternate channels” should be 
discounted, stating that “[t]he material difference standard focuses 
on differences in the goods themselves, not differences in their 
channels of distribution or the consumer expectations in those 
channels.”207  It therefore affirmed the ITC’s determination that SKF 
did not establish a material difference between its own products and 
                                                          
 198. SKF USA, 423 F.3d at 1315. 
 199. Id. at 1315. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1316. 
 202. Id. at 1317. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. (noting that the ITC excluded consumer expectations as a basis for its 
decision). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 1317-18 (reiterating SKF USA’s position that its services were 
categorically superior to “any services that others could provide”). 
 207. Id. at 1318. 
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those of the distributors based on post-sale technical and engineering 
services and the ITC’s findings that there was no section 337 violation 
by the importation of the gray market ball bearings.208 
The case stands for two important propositions.  First, it is now 
clear that differences in gray market goods do not have to be physical 
differences or differences in accompanying safety stickers, labels, or 
instruction manuals.209  The differences may include any “material 
difference” that a consumer would likely consider, including any 
services related to the sale of the product.210  However, the Federal 
Circuit also made explicit that the mark owner cannot claim 
infringement against a gray market importer when it itself is selling a 
substantial quantity of nonconforming goods.211  While the court set 
no particular standard, it found in this case that SKF’s sales of 12.6% 
of nonconforming goods defeated its claim.212  Any producer who 
wishes to protect its line from gray market sales must ensure that it 
upholds its own product quality control.213 
F.  Trade Dress and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
The Federal Circuit possesses exclusive appellate jurisdiction over 
patent cases decided by the federal district courts throughout the 
United States.214  Some patent cases include both patent claims and 
trademark claims, especially trade dress claims under section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act.215  Thus, in addition to reviewing trademark 
decisions of the TTAB and the ITC, the Federal Circuit also reviews 
trademark rulings from federal district court patent decisions. 
Hartco Engineering, Inc. v. Wang’s International, Inc.216 is one such 
case.  In Hartco, the Federal Circuit reviewed a design patent decision 
                                                          
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 1313 (noting that the court was “mak[ing] explicit what may have 
only been implicit in Gamut”). 
 210. Id. at 1314. 
 211. Id. at 1315. 
 212. Id. at 1317-18. 
 213. However, a manufacturer’s sales of used or refurbished nonconforming 
goods can still protect the integrity of its product line.  See id. at 1318 (noting that 
“consumers do not expect used or refurbished goods to be the same as new goods 
and that for such goods, ‘material differences’ do not necessarily measure consumer 
confusion” (quoting Nitro Leisure Prods. L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
 214. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (2000) (providing that the “Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent 
infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting”). 
 215. See, e.g., Hartco Eng’g, Inc. v. Wang’s Int’l, Inc., 142 F. App’x 455 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (evaluating claims involving patent and trade dress infringement). 
 216. 142 F. App’x 455 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, including a trade dress claim under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.217  At trial, the jury found that Wang’s willfully infringed 
Hartco’s claimed trade dress in a hitch cover design218 and packaging 
design.219  Hartco argued that the jury instructions erroneously failed 
to require proof of secondary meaning for product configuration 
trade dress and inherent distinctiveness for packaging trade dress.220 
Applying Fifth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court trade dress law and 
writing for a unanimous three-member panel, Circuit Judge Sharon 
Prost rejected Hartco’s argument that its hitchcover design is 
inherently distinctive.221  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,222 the Federal Circuit confirmed 
that “a product design cannot be inherently distinctive as a matter of 
law.”223  To determine whether Hartco had met its burden of 
presenting sufficient evidence to support a finding of secondary 
meaning, the court indicated that it must look to the “length and 
nature of use, sales volume and advertising, consumer surveys and 
testimony, and [the] appellant’s intent.”224  Because the record 
showed that Hartco did not introduce evidence of this type (other 
than having sold its hitchcover design for four years before appellants 
sold their competing four propeller hitchcover design), the court 
concluded that “Hartco did not meet its burden of establishing 
secondary meaning” and because “no reasonable jury could have 
concluded that Hartco showed secondary meaning,”225 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of “judgment of 
noninfringement as a matter of law, together with the damage award 
relevant to this claim.”226 
                                                          
 217. Id. at 456, 459. 
 218. The trade dress for the hitchcover design is described as a “novelty trailer 
hitchcover featuring a three-blade marine propeller . . . that spins from the force of 
moving air when attached to the trailer hitch of a vehicle.”  Id. at 456. 
 219. Id.  The Federal Circuit identified the claimed packaging trade dress as 
consisting of five elements:  (1) a clear plastic package showing the hitchcover 
product inside, (2) blue cardboard background, (3) “white lettering identifying the 
product and Hartco Engineering’s trademark ‘PROP’R-HITCHCOVER’”, (4) “red 
lines in the upper left hand corner”, and (5) “a picture of the product in position on 
a vehicle and the product’s patent information in the upper right hand corner.”  Id. 
at 461. 
 220. Id. at 458. 
 221. Id. at 460. 
 222. 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000). 
 223. Hartco, 142 F. App’x at  460. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 460-61. 
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With respect to Hartco’s product packaging trade dress claim, the 
Federal Circuit confirmed that “[u]nlike product configuration, 
product packaging is capable of being inherently distinctive and thus 
a showing of secondary meaning may be unnecessary to prevail on a 
trade dress claim.”227  Although the court recognized that separately 
the packaging elements may not be subject to protection, “taken 
together, Hartco’s trade dress is ipso facto inherently distinctive and 
thus, subject to protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”228  
With respect to the question of packaging trade dress infringement 
because Hartco presented evidence of trade dress similarity, 
interchangeability of products, common purchasers and advertisers, 
actual confusion among consumers, and showed that Wang’s 
intended to copy Hartco’s packaging, the court found that the jury 
verdict was supported by substantial evidence that there was a 
likelihood of confusion.229  As a result, the portion of the decision 
concerning damages was vacated for further proceedings to 
determine the appropriate damages for the successful packaging 
trade dress infringement claim.230 
In 2005, Circuit Judge Sharon Prost wrote another trade dress 
opinion interpreting section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, this time 
applying Ninth Circuit trade dress law.231  In Decorations for Generations, 
Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,232 the Federal Circuit concluded that 
substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict in favor of the 
manufacturer’s trade dress and unfair competition claims concerning 
a steel Christmas tree stand233 and reversed the district court’s denial 
                                                          
 227. Id. at 461. 
 228. Id.  This portion of the decision seems rather generous to Hartco 
Engineering and a bit weak in reasoning.  Without citation, the court held that 
“[p]ackaging trade dress is inherently distinctive if its intrinsic nature identifies the 
source of the product.”  Id. at 461.  Even more significantly, the Federal Circuit made 
no mention of what substantial evidence the jury could have relied upon to support a 
necessary finding of inherent distinctiveness in packaging having a clear plastic case 
to view the enclosed product, a blue cardboard backing with a picture of the 
hitchcover in use on the upper right hand corner, and the product brand positioned 
on the upper left hand corner.  Indeed, it is not self-evident, at least to this author, 
that the intrinsic nature and positioning of these combined elements automatically 
identifies the source of the product.  Equally significantly, the court also made no 
mention of whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the 
threshold question of whether the elements claimed in the alleged trade dress were 
nonfunctional, a requirement that has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000), as well as the Fifth 
Circuit in Eng’g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335, 1350 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 229. Hartco, 142 F. App’x at 460. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Decorations for Generations, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 128 F. App’x 
133 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 232. Id. 
 233. The Christmas tree stand design was described as 
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of the defendant retailer’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.234  Applying Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court trade dress 
precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the record did not 
contain substantial evidence in support of the manufacturer’s claim 
of secondary meaning in the alleged product configuration trade 
dress.235 
The district court had found that “substantial evidence” supported 
a finding that the following secondary meaning factors had been 
established by the Christmas tree stand manufacturer:  (1) length of 
time and exclusivity of use, (2) intentional copying, and (3) evidence 
of actual confusion.236  Based on the Federal Circuit’s review of the 
record, it only agreed that substantial evidence supported the finding 
concerning the length of time and exclusivity of use of the Christmas 
tree stand design.237  It maintained that sales for six consecutive years 
of roughly the same design “is a sufficient amount of time, year after 
year, to support a jury finding” on this factor, even though the 
seasonal nature of the product made it available and on display only 
five to six weeks each year.238 
In rejecting the trial court’s finding of substantial evidence to 
support the “intentional copying” element of the Ninth Circuit’s 
secondary meaning test for protectable trade dress, the Federal 
Circuit held:  “While there was evidence introduced that supported 
the conclusion that the defendants had indeed copied utilitarian 
features of [the manufacturer’s] tree stand, there was no evidence 
introduced that the defendants intentionally copied protected trade 
dress that had been perceived by consumers as originating from a 
                                                          
[A] one-foot steel pipe (intended to contain the tree base), a six–inch square 
plate of flat steel (that serves as a base), and four legs protruding from the 
corners of the base and made of 24-inch long steel bars.  The stand also 
includes four screws that are meant to secure the tree by fitting into 
apertures that are evenly spaced around the steel pipe component.  In order 
to evoke Christmas colors, [the] stand was colored green and red, with the 
base and body of the stand colored green and the rim of the stand covered 
by a red plastic covering. 
Id. at 134.  Although these elements seem to cry out for being labeled as “functional,” 
and although a finding of nonfunctionality is a threshold question for determining 
trade dress protection, the Federal Circuit “decline[d] to address whether substantial 
evidence supported the jury’s finding that certain aspects of the tree stand are non-
functional,” since it already had determined that “substantial evidence does not 
support the jury’s finding that the . . . tree stand had established secondary meaning 
in the minds of consumers . . . .”  Id. at 139 n.6. 
 234. Id. at 134. 
 235. Id. at 136, 139. 
 236. Id. at 137. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 137-38. 
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particular manufacturer.”239  Finally, in rejecting the trial court’s 
finding of substantial evidence to support the “actual confusion” 
element of the secondary meaning test, the Federal Circuit noted 
that the only evidence of so-called actual confusion in the record 
stemmed from confusion among employees of the parties, not 
consumers of the tree stand.240  Because the Federal Circuit was 
“aware of no precedent in the Ninth Circuit that would allow the 
confusion of ‘the relevant buying public’ to be inferred by testimony 
from company employees or associates,” it disagreed with the district 
court that substantial evidence supported the finding of actual 
confusion to support secondary meaning.241 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit was not as prolific in 2005 as compared to past 
years in issuing trademark opinions.  The court chose to issue 
precedential trademark decisions in only six cases.  Only one of the 
cases—the SKF USA decision concerning gray market goods—was 
identified by the court as involving an issue of first impression, 
namely, whether the difference between domestic goods and gray 
market goods must be physically manifested in the product or 
packaging in order to qualify as “materially different” and thus 
infringing.  While none of the 2005 Federal Circuit trademark cases 
can fairly be described as groundbreaking, they do advance the 
court’s growing and important body of trademark law. 
 
                                                          
 239. Id. at 138.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit specifically found “that the copied 
elements of [the] tree stand that were identified as being non-functional by the 
district court (i.e., the colors, the plastic rim, and the display box) were, in fact, 
utilitarian in nature.”  Id. 
 240. Id. at 138-39. 
 241. Id. at 139. 
